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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION-DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-RIGHT TO BE
PRESENT WHEN DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY ABSENTS-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution is not violated when a defendant voluntarily absents
himself from the trial and that the judge is at his discretion to
proceed.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Wilson, 712 A.2d 735 (Pa.
1998).
On April 13, 1990, James Wilson was arrested by the Philadelphia
police and charged with possession of a controlled substance,'
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
2
possession of drug paraphernalia, 3 and criminal conspiracy.4 Wilson
1. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 712 A.2d 735, 736 (Pa. 1998). Pennsylvania's law
concerning possession of a controlled substance is found in 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16):
Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a
person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the
appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant
to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise
authorized by this act.
Id. (citing 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16)).
2. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 736. Pennsylvania law concerning possession with intent to
deliver is found in 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30):
Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a
practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,
delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance. Id. (citing
35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)).
3. Id. Pennsylvania law on possession with intent to deliver is found at 35 Pa. Stat.
§ 780-113(a)(32):
The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of
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was released on bail.5 On April 15, 1991, Wilson was present for a
pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress evidence seized by
police; the court denied the motion.6 On April 17, 1991, Wilson
appeared and participated in plea negotiations outside the
courtroom.7 As his defense attorney entered the courtroom, Wilson
fled.8 Following an exchange held at side bar,9 the court issued a
bench warrant' ° and decided to resume in Wilson's absence. The
parties presented their evidence after the jury was sworn.11 Wilson
planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding,
converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking,
storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing
into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.
Id. (citing 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113(a)(32)).
4. Id. Pennsylvania law dealing with criminal conspiracy is located at 18 Pa- Cons. Stat.
§ 903:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime
if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such
other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct
which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such
crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903).
5. Id.
6. Id. Wilson appeared before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Id.
A jury was selected and the court announced it would proceed the following day. Id.
7. Wi/son, 712 A.2d at 736. Wilson, accompanied by his attorney, participated in plea
negotiations. Id. The parties failed to accomplish a plea agreement. Id.
8. Id. The court determined that Wilson had fled the courthouse. Id. Wilson, who
actively participated in plea negotiations outside the courtroom, fled after a plea could not
be reached and defense counsel had returned to the courtroom. Id. Defense counsel offered
no knowledge of Wilson's whereabouts or whether he would return. Id.
9. Id. A side bar refers to the area at the side of the judge's bench where trial counsel
and the judge discuss matters out of hearing of the jury. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 962 (6th ed.
1991). The following is the conversation that took place at side bar.
[PROSECUTOR]: I would like to place on the record that the defendant was present
yesterday when the jury was selected. The jury had not been sworn and the defendant
was present this morning. THE COURT: He was present this morning?
[PROSECUTOR]: He was present this morning. He had conversations with his
attorney. In fact, we discussed working out a plea to this particular case. THE
COURT: Right. [PROSECUTOR]: When [defense counsel] was in the courtroom and
defendant was outside in the hallway, he absented himself.... There is nothing that
would make us believe that this is anything other than a willful absenting of himself.
There is nothing to make us think that there was any particular harm in the
courtroom, outside the courtroom of City Hall. THE COURT: He was participating in
the plea negotiations and then absented himself. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On the other
hand, Your Honor, perhaps the Court would consider continuing the matter until there
is an attempt to find the defendant. THE COURT: No.
Id.
10. Wilson, 712 A.2d 736. A bench warrant is a process issued by the Court itself for
the arrest of a person. BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 107 (6th ed. 1991).
11. Id. Even though both Wilson and the commonwealth assert that Wilson fled after
Pennsylvania v. Wilson
was found guilty on all counts and sentencing was postponed until
Wilson was apprehended.'2
Wilson was apprehended and retained new counsel, who filed
post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. 13 The trial court concluded that
the police violated the "knock and announce" rule when executing
the original search warrant.' 4 The trial judge granted a new trial
and suppressed the evidence that had been seized.' 5 The court also
found that Wilson's original counsel was ineffective for failing to
call a witness who may have been able to testify as to the
invalidity of the execution of the search warrant. 16  The
commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied.' 7  The commonwealth then filed an appeal to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.'8 The superior court reversed the
order for a new trial, reinstated the convictions, and remanded for
sentencing.19 The superior court held that the trial court did not
abuse its authority in conducting the trial in Wilson's absence or in
permitting his post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. 20 It also held
that the police search was conducted properly and that the
evidence should not have been suppressed.
2'
On appeal, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether a
trial court may conduct a trial in absentia when the defendant flees
without an explanation and after trial has commenced. 22 The court
first noted that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional
right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
the jury was sworn, it is clear from the record that he left after the jury was empaneled but
before the jury was sworn. Id.
12. Id. at 737. Defense counsel filed no post-trial motions. Id.
13. Id. Wilson remained a fugitive until September of 1991, when he was arrested on
unrelated charges. Id. "Nunc pro tunc" signifies a thing done now that shall have the same
legal effect as if done at the time when it ought to have been done. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
737 (6th ed. 1991).
14. Id. The "knock and announce" rule requires the police to knock and announce their
authority and purpose before entering a home in the execution of a search warrant. BLAcK'S
LAw DICToNARY 603 (6th ed. 1991).






20. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 737.
21. Id.
22. Id. Wilson filed a petition for allowance of appeal. Id. The order granting allocatur
phrased the limited issue as follows: "[W]hether the trial in absentia violated [Wlson]'s
federal and state constitutional rights." Id. Wilson's brief argued only that the commonwealth
should adopt the federal standard for trials in absentia. Id.
1999
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and Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution to. be
present at every stage of a criminal trial.23 However, the court
noted that, in noncapital cases, a defendant can waive this right
through his or her own actions, either expressly or implicitly.24 The
defendant's waiver must be knowing and voluntary.25 The court
reasoned that when a defendant, such as Wilson, is initially present
when the trial commences, then leaves or fails to attend further
proceedings, he is deemed to have knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to be present.26 The court relied on Pennsylvania
precedent that a trial court may, in its discretion, conduct a trial in
absentia when the defendant absconds without cause after the trial
commences.
27
The court then looked to the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in support of trials in absentia.28 The court pointed out
that a defendant who is released on bail before trial gives the court
his or her assurance that he or she will be present to stand trial
and submit to sentencing if found guilty.29 The court emphasized
that, unless the defendant is prevented from attending the
proceedings for reasons beyond his or her control, he or she is
expected to be present at all stages of trial and owes the court an
23. Id. U.S CONST. amend. VI. provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides, in part, that "[iln all criminal prosecutions the accused
hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses against him.. .. "
24. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 737 (citing Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 440 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Id. The court considered three cases: Commonwealth v. Sullens, 619 A.2d 1349
(1992); Commonwealth v. Diehl, 107 A.2d 543 (1954); and Commonwealth v. Graham, 375
A.2d 161 (1977).
27. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Clark, 407 A.2d 28 (1979) (holding that trial in
absentia was proper where defendant was present for empaneling of the jury, then
absconded); Graham 375 A2d. at 161 (allowing trial in absentia where defendant was present
during the morning session when jury selection took place, but failed to return after the
lunch break)). Id.
28. Id. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that common sense should not
allow an accused person who is on bail to withdraw himself from the Courts and break up a
trial already in progress. Id. "Neither in criminal or civil cases will the law allow a person to
take advantage of his own wrong." Id. at 738. (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
457-58 (1912)).
29. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 738 (citing United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.
1972)).
Pennsylvania v. Wilson
affirmative duty to advise it when he or she will be absent.30
The court then analyzed the longstanding rule that permits trials
to take place in a defendant's absence.3' The court addressed the
defendant's argument that the commonwealth should weigh certain
factors before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia.3 2 These
factors were set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.3 These factors include the likelihood that the trial
could soon thereafter take place with the defendant present; the
difficulty of rescheduling, particularly -in multiple-defendant trials;
and the burden on the government in having to undertake two
trials, especially in multiple-defendant trials in which the evidence
against the defendants is often overlapping and more than one trial
might place the government's witnesses in substantial jeopardy. 4
The Wilson Court analyzed the Tortora factors, such as whether
the defendant was advised when proceedings were to commence
and whether he or she voluntarily, knowingly, and without
justification failed to be present.35 The Tortora Court also advised
that before a trial court decided to proceed in the defendant's
absence it should look to the likelihood that the defendant would
soon return and the difficulty of rescheduling the trial; however, it
stressed that the decision to continue ultimately remains within the
discretion of the trial judge.3 The Wilson Court did not discount
with the Tortora factors but noted that the list is not exhaustive
and other factors may be taken into consideration.37
30. Id. The court offered, as an example of a valid reason for failing to appear, a
defendant who has a medical or family emergency. Id.
31. Id. at 738. This rule was codified in Pennsylvania in 1968 as Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1117 dealing with the presence of the defendant. Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1117 states, "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every
stage of trial including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant's absence
without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return of the
verdict" PA R CRIM. P. 1117.
32. Id. at 738. These factors were set forth and applied to trials in absentia pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b). Id. (citing 7brtora, 464 F2d at 1206 (2d Cir.
1972)).
33. Id. (citing Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1206). In Tortora, a defendant failed to appear on
the day of the trial. Id. The court determined that the defendant was aware of the date and
time of the hearing and, when attempts to locate the defendant failed, the court proceeded
without him. Id. The defendant was convicted in absentia. Id. at 739.
34. United States v. Tortora, 464 F2d 1202, 1210 (1972).
35. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 739. The Second Circuit reasoned that by looking to these
factors it could ensure that the defendant had an opportunity to be present at all stages of
the trial and was afforded due process of law. Id. (citing Tortoa, 464 F2d at 1206).
36. Tortora, 464 F2d at 1209.
37. Wi/son, 712 A-2d at 739. The court does not give any additional factors. Id.
1999
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The court next addressed Wilson's argument that, before a
through inquiry into defendant's whereabouts can be conducted, a
recess or continuance is proper.38 The court again emphasized that
the decision to proceed with the trial remains within the trial
court's discretion. 9 The court also noted the numerous difficulties
that would exist if a trial court were required to delay a trial and
conduct a hearing on the issue of whether a defendant would
reappear.40 The court reasoned that the time and resources required
for a separate hearing would put the pace and timing of the trial
into the defendant's hands.41 The court envisioned that flight by a
defendant could be used as a defense tactic to obtain continuances
that otherwise would not be granted.42 The court considered the
difficulty and hardship such a situation would place on the court,
jury, and witnesses.43
The court concluded by noting that Wilson was present for the
suppression hearing and for jury selection and had participated in
plea negotiations.44 Wilson fled only after the parties were unable to
reach a plea agreement. 45 The court found that it was clear from
the record that Wilson was fully aware of the date and time of trial,
was not detained beyond his control, and could have appeared the
day of the trial.46 The court noted that it was reasonable for the
trial court to conclude that Wilson fled without cause and
voluntarily waived his right to be present.47 Therefore, the court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion of power
in deciding to proceed in Wilson's absence.48 As a result, the
38. Id. The court emphasized that, even pursuant to Tortora, the trial court is not
required to postpone the trial to weigh the likelihood of the defendant returning or the
inconvenience to the parties that a continuance would cause. Id.
39. Id. The court reasoned that a trial court can conduct an inquiry on the record and
make a determination of whether to continue without a hearing on the issue or unnecessary
delay. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The court stressed that judicial economy would be lost and the flow of the trial
would be disrupted. Id.
42. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 739. This could be used as a defense tactic because it would
delay the trial from proceeding to an ultimate conclusion of guilt. Id.
43. Id. The court noted that everyone would be held in limbo while waiting for the
defendant. Id.
44. Id. The suppression hearing, jury selection, and plea negotiations took place
separately on three consecutive days. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court noted that Wilson did appear on the day of the trial but later fled. Id.
47. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 739.




Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Pennsylvania Superior
Court decision reinstating the conviction and remanding for
sentencing.
49
Justice Nigro filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.5° Justice Nigro agreed with the majority that trial may
proceed in absentia when a defendant voluntarily absents himself
or herself, however, Justice Nigro believed an on-the-record inquiry
is required to determine whether the defendant's absence was
"without cause."51 Justice Nigro explained that Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1117(a) requires an inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding a defendant's departure to determine
whether a defendant's departure is without cause.52 Justice Nigro
suggested that if a defendant disappears, defense counsel should be
afforded a twenty-four hour period to find the client or produce a
legitimate reason for his or her absence.5 He explained that this
short adjournment ensures that a defendant's absence is compelling
without permitting him to benefit from deliberate flight.54 He also
opined that such an adjournment would place little inconvenience
upon the commonwealth because the jury and witnesses need be
recessed for only twenty-four hours.5 Because the trial court failed
to conduct an inquiry into Wilson's whereabouts before proceeding
to trial in absentia, Justice Nigro dissented.56 He relied on the fact
that defense counsel requested a continuance to allow an inquiry
into the reason for Wilson's disappearance but the trial court
refused to continue the case.
57
A defendant's right to be present at trial is a longstanding
guarantee. "The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution;
49. Id.
50. Id. at 740.
51. Id.
52. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 740. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1117(a) provides:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant's
absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the
return of the verdict
Id.
53. Id. Justice Nigro suggested that this procedure acknowledges the defendant's
affirmative duty to advise the court of a valid reason for failing to appear and gives counsel,
the defendant, or a family member an opportunity to do so. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 741.
57. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 740.
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and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1117(a) guarantee the
right of a defendant to be present at court in every stage of a
criminal trial."5 Notwithstanding this right, in Diaz v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court in held that, when a
defendant who is not charged with a capital offense voluntarily
absents himself or herself after the trial has begun, he or waives
the right to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with
the trial in like manner and like effect as if he were present. 9 In
Diaz, the defendant was charged with the crime of noncapital
homicide. 60 On two occasions, the defendant, who was at large on
bail but present for the trial, voluntarily absented himself from the
trial but consented that it should proceed in the presence of his
attorney.61 The defendant later objected that he could not waive his
right to be present and that the court was without power to
proceed in his absence. 62 The Court found that the defendant
voluntarily absented himself at the latter phase of the trial and
Philippine law (the applicable forum law) does not make the
defendant's presence indispensable at this stage.6 The Court
explained that courts have regarded an accused who is in custody
and one who is charged with a capital offense as being incapable
of waiving the right to be present; the one, because his or her
presence or absence is not within his or her own control and the
other, because, in addition to being in custody, he or she is deemed
to suffer the constraint naturally incident to an apprehension of the
58. Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 440 (1994). U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides,
in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." PA- CONsT. art. I, § 9 explains: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused hath a right . . . to meet the witness face to face." PA. R.Cm . P. 1117(a)
provides:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant's absence without
cause shall not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return of the verdict
59. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). The Court cited a long history cases
from various jurisdictions including Flight v. State, Ohio pt. 1, 181; Wilson v. State, 2 Ohio St.
319; McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39; Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675; Stoddard v. State, 132 Wis. 520;
Shalinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241. Id. A capital offense is one which may be punishable by
death. BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 143 (6th ed. 1991).
60. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 444. Diaz was charged with the crime of noncapital homicide and
was not eligible for the death penalty. Id.
61. Id. at 445. These absences were in the latter part of the trial when two witnesses
for the United States were both examined and cross-examined. Id. at 453.
62. Id. at 453.
63. Id. at 454.
498 Vol. 37:491
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awful penalty that would follow conviction.6 However, in a case in
which the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody,
the prevailing rule has been that a defendant's act of voluntarily
absenting himself or herself after the trial has begun in his or her
presence does not nullify what has been done or prevent the
completion of the trial; rather, it operates as a waiver of the right
to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in
like manner and with like effect as if he or she were present.65 The
Court distinguished Diaz from earlier cases in which it reached the
opposite result because, in each of these former cases, the accused
was in custody, charged with a capital offense, and sentenced to
death.6 The Court reasoned that, in Diaz, there was no infraction
of the law and, once the defendant absented, the trial court could
proceed without him
67
The commonwealth has long recognized that, in capital cases, the
defendant's presence is necessary at every stage of the trial,
whether he or she is at liberty on bail or in custody.6 As early as
1851, in Commonwealth v. Prine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the same was true in the case of noncapital felonies.6 9 In
Prine, the defendant was a prisoner indicted for burglary and
larceny.70 Prine's counsel waived the presence of the defendant; the
jury was called, empaneled, and sworn and returned a verdict of
guilty.71 On appeal, it was assigned for error that the defendant was
not present during the trial, when the verdict was rendered by the
64. Id. at 455. The Court refers to the fact that most defendants charged with a capital
felony are not given bail and, thus, have no opportunity to be voluntarily absent. Id.
65. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455.
66. Id. at 458. The Court cited several cases, including Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574;
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370; Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442; and Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343.
67. Id. at 454. The Court quoted Justice Morris, who explained the reasoning behind
proceeding without the defendant.
It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an
accused person, being at large upon bail, should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to
withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break up a trial already
commenced. The practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law, would be
to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to
permit it ....
Id. at 457 (citing Falk v. United States, 180 U.S. 636 (1901)).
68. Commonwealth v. Diehl, 107 A.2d 543, 544 (1954).
69. Commonwealth v. Prine, 18 Pa. 103 (1851).
70. Prine, 18 Pa. at 103. The defendant was one of several prisoners being tried. Id.
71. Id. The defense counsel also had the jury polled individually and the jurors
answered that the defendant was guilty of burglary and larceny. Id.
1999
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jury, or when the sentence was pronounced against him.72 The
court noted that this was a case of first impression in
Pennsylvania.73 The Prtne Court reasoned that a defendant's
presence at every stage of the trial is a matter of substance not
peculiar to trials for murder.74 A defendant's presence at trial for a
felony at common law is required because the mitigation of the
punishment does not change the character of the crime.75 The court
noted that, in other felony cases, it is allowable to presume that
constitutional safeguards were provided; but, when it is stated on
the record positively that the prisoner was not present, the court
cannot shut its eyes to that fact.76 The court directed that the
defendant be held to answer a fresh indictment. 7
In 1878, the court changed its position on trials in absentia for
noncapital felonies and held that a defendant on bail who leaves
the courtroom and is absent when the verdict is returned cannot
raise a motion in arrest of judgment. 78 Lynch involved a trial of a
prisoner charged with larceny, who, while on bail, voluntarily left
the courtroom during the jury's deliberation.79 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's overruling of Lynch's
motion for arrest of judgment, reasoning that, historically, larceny
was not a capital offense for which death could be imposed.80 The
court explained that the factual situation of Lynch was not
analogous to Prine;8' in Prine, the defendant was charged with
burglary, a capital offense.8 2 The court noted that larceny is in the
category of misdemeanors for which the defendant may appear and
plead by attorney; when such a misdemeanor is the crime charged,
the voluntary absence of a defendant on bail waives his or her right
72. Id.
73. Id. The court revisited precedent and could not find any case in which a prisoner
on trial for a felony was not present at every stage of the trial. Id.
74. Id..
75. Prine, 18 Pa. at 105.
76. Id. The court refers to felonies that are not murder. Id. The court also questioned
the authority of the defendant's attorney to waive the defendant's presence. Id.
77. Id. at 105.
78. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa- 189 (1878). A motion for arrest of judgement is a
motion that, if granted, has the effect of refusing to render the original judgement due to an
intrinsic matter which renders the original judgement erroneous. BLACK'S LAw DicMrONARY 72
(6th ed. 1991).
79. Lynch, 88 Pa. at 189. The record showed that the defendant had been called when
the jury returned a verdict of guilty but he failed to appear. Id.
80. Id. at 193. The court looked specifically to the Act of 31st May 1718. Id.
81. Prine, 18 Pa. at 103.
82. Lynch, 88 Pa at 193-95.
Vol. 37:491
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to be present.83
In Commonwealth v. Diehl, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reiterated that the defendant's right to be present can be waived if
he or she has not been charged with a capital offense.8 In Diehl,
the defendant was convicted of seven criminal offenses, four of
which were felonies85 The defendant raised an infringement of his
constitutional rights under Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.86 Specifically, the defendant complained that his rights
were violated when additional instructions were given to the jury
during deliberations in his absence.87 The court held that, in a
noncapital felony case in which competent counsel for the
defendant is present during the giving of additional instructions to
the jury, the defendant's absence will be construed as a voluntary
waiver of his right to be present.,8
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Sullens, 9  the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court first held that a defendant may be
tried in absentia if he or she is absent without cause at the time his
or her trial is scheduled to begin. In Sullens, the defendant was
charged with escape and, after being arraigned, waived his right to
a jury trial on the charge.90 The defendant was notified of his
nonjury trial date but failed to appear 1 The superior court held
that an accused cannot waive his right to be present at trial by
failing to appear on the date scheduled for trial.92 The superior
83. Id. at 194. The court also required the defendant to be called for appearance. Id.
84. Commonwealth v. Diehl, 107 A.2d 543 (1954).
85. Diehl, 107 A.2d at 543. The defendant was involved in a shooting in a caf6 and also
exchanged gunfire with the police that pursued him. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 545. Both the prosecution and defense admitted that defense counsel was
present both during deliberations and when the additional instructions were charged to the
jury. Id. The record also shows that no objections were made to the giving of additional
instructions or to the giving of instructions in the defendant's absence and that no exception
was taken to the instructions given. Id.
88. Id. The defendant's counsel also argued there was error because there was no
stenographic record of the additional jury instructions given. Id. The court explained that,
because counsel never requested the instructions be made part of the record, no
constitutional rights were violated. Id.
89. 619 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1992). The defendant must be found to have been absent
without cause as defined in Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1117(a). Id.
90. Su//ens, 619 A.2d at 1350. The defendant escaped from custody on an unrelated
charge, was apprehended, and charged with escape. Id.
91. Id. The defendant was granted bail on the subsequent escape charge. Id.
92. Commonwealth v. Sullens, 584 A.2d 1050 (1990). The superior court reversed the
trial court's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. The superior court did not cite or
discuss Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1117(a), which appears to authorize trial in
absentia under the circumstances present. Sullens, 619 k2d at 1351.
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court relied on its precedent in Commonwealth v. Felton, in which
it was held that, when a defendant fails to appear for the
commencement of a trial, the trial could not begin in his or her
absence.93 The supreme court disagreed, holding that permitting a
defendant to halt his or her trial by absconding before the trial
commences encourages a defendant to ignore the summons to trial
if he or she thinks a guilty verdict is likely, secure in the
knowledge that he or she cannot be convicted until apprehended.94
In Sullens, the supreme court placed much emphasis on the fact
that the trial court found that the defendant knew of the trial date
and that his absence was "without cause" under Pennsylvania Rule
of Criminal Procedure 1117(a).
95
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, following a long history of
precedent in the commonwealth, reached the correct decision in
Commonwealth v. Wilson. The cases decided in Pennsylvania prior
to Wilson clearly demonstrate that when a defendant absents
himself or herself without cause from a trial proceeding, that
defendant voluntarily waives the right to be present at every stage
of a trial.96 After reviewing the relevant precedent, the trial court's
93. Sullens, 619 A.2d at 1351 (citing Commonwealth v. Felton, 307 A.2d 51 (1973)). The
superior court rationalized that the situation in which a defendant is never present in the
courtroom is distinguishable from a proceeding in which the defendant voluntarily absents
himself or herself from the courtroom subsequent to the initiation of the proceeding. Id. The
latter encourages a defendant to refuse to appear whenever he or she expects the judge or
jury to render a verdict of guilty. Id. If the waiver rule were extended to include actions
taken by an accused prior to trial, fugitives who are unaware of the charges against them
could be tried in absentia. Id.
94. Id. The court quoted the late Justice McDermott: "No society on earth offers more
than we do to preserve and protect the rights of those held for trial. It is more than simple
discourtesy not to attend. It is an anarchical contempt of everything that so many have died
to preserve." Id. at 1351-52 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 610 A.2d 439, 441 (1992)
(McDermott, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 1350. The defendant admitted that he had notice of the trial date and stated
that he had absented himself because he did not want to be found guilty. Id. The court
stated:
A contrary rule.., would be a travesty of justice. It would allow an accused at large
on bail to immobilize the commencement of a criminal trial and frustrate an already
overtaxed judicial system until the trial date meets, if ever, with his pleasure and
convenience. It would permit a defendant to play cat and mouse with the prosecution
to delay the trial in an effort to discourage the appearance of prosecution witnesses
.... A defendant has a right to his day in court, but he does not have the right
unilaterally to select the day and hour.
Id. at 1352 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 189-90 (3d Cir
1975)).
96. See lynch v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 189 (1878); Commonwealth v. Diehl, 107 A.2d
543 (Pa. 1954); Commonwealth v. Sullens, 619 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 1992); Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442 (1912).
Pennsylvania v. Wilson
reasoning behind its decision to proceed in the defendant's absence
is clear. Wilson was charged with a felony, but he was not charged
with a capital felony.97 Wilson was present for a suppression
hearing, jury selection, and plea negotiations and only fled the
courthouse after plea negotiations. 98 It was clear to the trial court
that the defendant was absent without cause.99
The facts of this case clearly show that Wilson voluntarily
absented himself from the trial proceedings without cause. An
accused in the American justice system is protected by many
safeguards. To allow a defendant who is already heavily protected
to hold a court at bay and bring the justice system to a standstill
would allow the defendant to control the workings of the judicial
system. To do so would be tantamount to allowing the accused to
take advantage of his or her wrongdoing. Those who escape from
prison or disappear while on bail could bring to a halt an already
backlogged criminal justice system.
Nonetheless, Justice Nigro's dissent is worthy of analysis. Justice
Nigro dissented on the grounds that an on-the-record inquiry was
not performed to determine if in fact the defendant's absence was
"without cause."100 In Wilson, there was no official on-the-record
inquiry into Wilson's whereabouts. There was a conversation at side
bar regarding Wilson's absence; then the trial judge decided to
proceed.101 Defense counsel requested and was denied a
continuance to find Wilson.102 The trial court was justified in its
decision to proceed in Wilson's absence. Wilson was present at the
courthouse earlier in the day.'°3
However, an on-the-record inquiry should be performed before a
court can proceed with a trial in absentia. Had Wilson been present
for a full day of proceedings and failed to return the next morning,
how would the court know whether his absence was "without
cause?" It would be impossible for a court to discern this
information accurately without an on-the-record inquiry into the
defendant's whereabouts. The defendant could have health
problems, familial problems, or a wide range of other serious
97. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 736.
98. Id. at 739.
99. Id. at 736. It became apparent to the court that Wilson fled the courthouse during
plea negotiations "without cause." Id.
100. Id. at 740 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 736. The side bar conversation was on the record. Id.




problems that arise in daily life. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 1117(a) requires an inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's departure to determine whether a
defendant's departure is without cause. 1°4 The federal courts also
require a record inquiry to ascertain an explanation for the absence
of the accused; the court then balances the likelihood that the trial
could take place with the defendant's presence against the undue
convenience or prejudice occasioned by a slight delay or
rescheduling of the trial.10 5 This inquiry, as in Wilson, can be
discerned from events taking place in the courthouse, yet often it
requires a more in-depth inquiry.
Thus, Justice Nigro's suggestion of a twenty-four hour period for
counsel to produce the client is both judicially sensible and
economical. 1°6 Such an adjournment will not place a heavy burden
on the court, but it would ensure that a defendant's constitutional
right to be present at his or her trial is not violated.
David J. DelFiandra
104. PA. R. CRNt P. 1117(a).
105. United States v. Krout, 56 F3d 643, 646 (5th Cir 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1076,
citing United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir 1983).
106. Wilson, 712 A.2d at 740 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
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